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Undercutting Employee Mobility  
THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT IN THE 
TRADE SECRET CONTEXT 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, Congressman Bill Hughes stood before the U.S. 
House of Representatives to describe what type of person the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)1 was directed toward: 
“The hacker is . . . a bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious 
youth,” who could “become the white-collar crime superstar of 
tomorrow.”2 Hughes warned his colleagues that in this new 
iteration of corporate crime, “[t]he tools of the trade [will not 
be] Smith and Wesson, but IBM and Apple.”3 
A number of factors contributed to the public 
apprehension of computer crime reflected in Hughes’s statement. 
Perhaps most important was the sudden and explosive rise of the 
personal computer, beginning in the late 1970s.4 While initially 
popular in the home, personal computers quickly took hold in the 
workplace in the early 1980s, meaning that a wider variety of 
 
 1 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1988)). 
 2 132 CONG. REC. 7816 (1986) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes). 
 3 Id. 
 4 As a testament to the explosive growth of personal computers during this 
time, consider that the Commodore 64, released in 1982, sold between 12.5 and 17 
million units, making it to this day the best-selling personal computer of all time. 
Gareth Halfacre, The Commodore 64 Turns 30, BIT-TECH.NET (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.bit-tech.net/news/hardware/2012/08/01/commodore-64-30/1; see also Lisa 
Fritscher, Commodore 64: The Best Selling Personal Computer of All Time, RETRO THING 
(Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.retrothing.com/2008/10/commodore-64-th.html; Jeremy Reimer, 
Total share: 30 Years of Personal Computer Market Share Figures, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 15, 
2005), http://arstechnica.com/features/2005/12/total-share/3/ (describing the first three 
highly successful personal computers released between 1977 and 1980: the Commodore 
PET, the Radio-Shack TRS-80, and the Apple). 
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valuable and sensitive information was stored in a digital form.5 
As this novel technology quickly became a large part of 
American work and home life, computers moved into the 
spotlight of both news and entertainment.6 A number of movies 
released during this time depicted and risibly exaggerated the 
potential for people to commit crime and wreak havoc using 
computers, adding to public concern.7 For example, in the movie 
WarGames, “a teenaged computer hacker who, thinking he was 
merely playing a game, inadvertently accessed a Department of 
Defense computer system and nearly precipitated 
thermonuclear war.”8 However the tipping point for legislators 
like Hughes came in 1984, when the findings of several private 
reports on cyber crime were “magnified by a groundswell of 
media attention toward computer crime generated by a number 
of incidents involving juvenile computer hackers.”9 
Having initially deferred to state-level regulation on the 
issue of computer crime, Congress ultimately gave in to public 
sentiment, and in 1984 enacted the CFAA as the first federal 
legislation directed specifically toward computer crime.10 The 
original act was relatively narrow in scope, addressing only a 
small number of sophisticated computer crimes leveled against 
the government and financial institutions.11 But the statute’s 
narrow reach would not last long. A number of subsequent 
 
 5 See Greggory S. Blundell, Personal Computers in the Eighties, BYTE, Jan. 1983, 
at 168, available at http://archive.org/stream/byte-magazine-1983-01/1983_01_BYTE_08-
01_Looking_Ahead#page/n175/mode/2up. During “the late 1970’s and early 1980’s . . . [n]ew 
managers entering the business community brought with them a keen awareness of 
computer systems gained from both college study and home use.” Id. 
 6 For example, in 1982 Time Magazine awarded its Person of the Year award to 
the computer, which Time deemed “Machine of the Year,” making it the first time a non-
human received the honor. A Letter From the Publisher: Jan. 3, 1983, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, 
available at http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/printout/0,8816,953629,00.html; see 
also Reimer, supra note 4. 
 7 See Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl><Alt><Delete>: Rethinking Federal 
Computer Crime Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 574, 596 (1997); see also Reid 
Skibell, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 910 (2003). 
 8 Olivenbaum, supra note 7, at 596. 
 9 Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured 
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 460 (1990). One such group of 
juvenile computer hackers was a collective of Milwaukee area teens known as the 414s, 
who in 1983 hacked the networks of a number of high profile institutions, including 
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and Los Alamos National Laboratory. Philip 
Elmer-Dewitt, Computers: The 414 Gang Strikes Again, TIME, Aug. 29, 1983, available 
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,949797,00.html. 
 10 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). The short title of 
the statute was amended to its current form in 1986, when it became the “Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act of 1986.” Pub. L. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 § 1 (1986). 
 11 See Griffith, supra note 9, at 460-61. 
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amendments, notably in 1986, 1994, and 1996, greatly altered 
and expanded the CFAA by increasing the number of crimes 
covered under the act, relaxing pleading standards, creating a 
private right of action, and expanding the statute’s scope to 
cover not just government and financial institution computers, 
but any computer connected to the internet.12 
While the expanded CFAA is still invoked against 
sophisticated computer hackers,13 the amendments have also 
created a dramatic rise in private litigation, in many cases 
involving defendants with only a rudimentary understanding of 
computers.14 For example, a private cause of action exists under 
the CFAA against anyone who “intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, 
and thereby obtains . . . information from any . . . computer [in 
use in interstate commerce].”15 Since 2000, employers have 
increasingly invoked these CFAA provisions against so-called 
“rogue employees” who misappropriate valuable trade secrets 
from a company before going to work for a competitor.16 
Traditionally, such a scenario would be addressed by state-level 
trade secret misappropriation statutes, many of which define a 
trade secret as “information . . . that . . . derives independent 
economic value . . . from not being generally known [and] is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.”17 But when a computer is involved in the 
misappropriation, the issue appears to fall within the CFAA’s 
ambit.18 In an attempt to restrict or uphold the CFAA’s 
 
 12 See Part II infra (describing the numerous amendments broadening the 
CFAA’s scope and substantive impact). 
 13 For example, in 2011, computer programmer and internet activist Aaron 
Swartz was indicted under three provisions of the CFAA for manipulating MIT’s 
computer network and subsequently “downloading over 4 million documents from JSTOR, 
a[n academic] research database.” Chris Gayomali, Reddit Co-Founder Aaron Swartz 
Indicted for Data Theft, Could Face 35 Years in Prison, TIME, July 19, 2011, available at 
http://techland.time.com/2011/07/19/reddit-co-founder-aaron-swartz-indicted-for-data-theft-
could-face-35-years-in-prison/. 
 14 See Part II infra (describing the facts of Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. 
Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000), in which defendant 
simply emailed documents from his current employer to his prospective employer). 
 15 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)2(C) (2012). In this section the term “obtains” has been 
broadly defined to include even looking at information on a computer. Matthew 
Kapitanyan, Beyond WarGames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Should be 
Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 405, 416 n.60 
(2012) (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986)). 
 16 See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 
119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1122-23 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
 17 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985); see also infra note 36 
(discussing the definition of a trade secret under the UTSA). 
 18 Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act: Two Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 429, 430. 
834 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
applicability in such contexts, many jurists and commentators 
have focused on the authorization provision of the CFAA, 
specifically the requirement that to establish liability, one must 
access a computer “without authorization or exceed[ing] 
authorized access.”19 A broad interpretation of authorization, 
grounded in principles of agency law, holds that an employee 
can act without authorization even when granted full access to 
a computer system, by simply taking action at odds with his or 
her employer’s interests.20 In contrast, a narrow approach to 
authorization turns not on the employee’s actions, but rather 
on the restrictions put in place by the employer.21 
Firmly establishing a narrow interpretation of 
authorization under the CFAA will bring the statute closer to 
its intended purpose of targeting sophisticated computer 
criminals. Resolving this issue, however, does not address the 
fact that reliance on the CFAA threatens to undercut policy 
considerations of trade secret law. In particular, trade secret law 
strikes an important balance between protecting valuable 
company information on the one hand, and promoting the 
mobility of knowledge-based workers on the other hand. The 
CFAA undercuts and ignores this balance.22 As employers 
increasingly turn to the CFAA as a favorable alternative to 
state-level trade secret statutes, a more sensible course of action 
is to amend the CFAA to adopt some limited substantive 
elements of trade secret law. Such an amendment would serve to 
diminish the CFAA’s utility as an end run on state-level trade 
secret statutes, and in turn prevent the CFAA from 
undercutting policy considerations advanced by trade secret law. 
Specifically, Congress should amend the CFAA to 
include a requirement that to establish liability, information 
misappropriated from a protected computer must have been 
“the subject of efforts . . . reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy,” mirroring a provision in the Uniform 
 
 19 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)2(C). See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: 
Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1596, 1649 (2003). 
 20 See Part II infra (outlining the agency-based approach to authorization); 
see also Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. at 1125 (citations omitted). 
 21 See Part II infra (outlining the narrow approach to authorization); see also 
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
“‘authorization’ depends on actions taken by the employer”). 
 22 See Brenton, supra note 18, at 447. “From a normative viewpoint, the crux 
of why trade secret law is better than the CFAA [is because trade secret law] . . . 
strikes a balance between safeguarding business information and guaranteeing 
employee mobility.” 
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Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).23 This amendment would preserve 
the CFAA’s utility as a means of redressing sophisticated data 
theft and sabotage, while preserving trade secret law’s careful 
balance between protecting valuable confidential information 
and promoting employee mobility. 
Part I examines the historical background of trade secret 
law, placing particular emphasis on the policy considerations 
embodied in the law. Part II examines the emergence of the 
CFAA in the employment context, and the resultant debate over 
the meaning of authorization under the CFAA. This section 
considers why employers have increasingly relied on the CFAA 
over state-level trade secret statutes, and discusses how this 
reliance has undercut the policy considerations of trade secret 
law. Part III argues that establishing a narrow reading of 
“authorization” under the statute will bring the CFAA closer to its 
original purpose while protecting the policy goals of trade secret 
law. Part IV proposes borrowing from trade secret law, and 
enacting a “reasonable efforts” amendment to the CFAA. 
A reasonable efforts amendment, combined with a narrow 
interpretation of authorization, would preserve the CFAA as a 
means of addressing serious breaches of reasonable data security, 
while preventing employers from relying on the CFAA’s civil 
remedies as an end run on alternative trade secret statutes. 
Under this approach, the CFAA would once again be rightly 
aimed at stopping “bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious”24 
computer hackers instead of targeting opportunistic consultants 
armed with USB thumb drives.25 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TRADE SECRET LAW 
“Since its emergence in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, trade secret law has developed primarily as a creature 
of state common law,”26 as a way for companies to protect some of 
their most valuable assets from misappropriation. Because of its 
organic formulation, trade secret law differs significantly from 
many other areas of intellectual property law.27 Where most areas 
of intellectual property law (such as copyright and patent law) 
 
 23 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985). 
 24 132 CONG. REC. 7816 (1986) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes). 
 25 See SKF USA, Inc. v. Bjerkness, 636 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704, 717 (N.D. Ill. 
2009) (where defendants were charged under the CFAA for misappropriating company 
information by transferring files to external hard drives and USB thumb drives). 
 26 Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 247 (1998). 
 27 Id. at 244. 
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establish an individual “right against the world” in a given idea or 
expression, trade secret law “does not impose liability for mere 
appropriation. Rather, the appropriator must have acquired, 
disclosed, or used the information in a wrongful manner.”28 
Proponents of trade secret law argue that this approach 
adds efficiency to the marketplace in two ways.29 First, an 
“incentive-based argument” posits that protecting trade secrets 
creates incentives for companies and individuals to continue 
innovating and creating new information without fear of losing it 
to a competitor, which is beneficial for the overall marketplace.30 
Second, by only protecting information that rises to the level of a 
trade secret, trade secret law promotes employee mobility, 
allowing employees to take knowledge and skills gained in 
previous jobs with them to new jobs, which is beneficial to the 
marketplace as a whole.31 
This emphasis on employee mobility complements what 
appears to be an emerging trend in the employment context, as 
average tenure decreases and employees move more 
transiently between employers.32 As reduced tenure with a 
given employer becomes more common, employees are trading 
the expected job security of long-term employment for the 
prospect of rapid skill development that comes with sporadic 
short-term and increasingly varied work experiences.33 By 
allowing employees to freely utilize a significant amount of the 
knowledge and skills gained in past jobs without subjecting 
themselves to potential misappropriation claims by past 
employers,34 trade secret law complements this structural shift in 
the employment context. Based on these considerations, it seems 
that the real efficiency in trade secret law is in the balance it 
strikes between protecting information where necessary on the 
one hand, and allowing for employee mobility on the other. 
 
 28 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 29 See, e.g., id. at 262. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
575, 586 (1999) (“These knowledge spillovers supercharge the innovative capacity of 
the district with renewed agglomeration economies, facilitating the development of new 
technologies that create a new industrial life cycle.”). 
 32 See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the 
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 554 (2001) 
(“Whereas previously, careers were understood to unfold in structured ways, by moving up 
job ladders in internal labor markets or along fixed lattices on organizational flow-charts, 
recent research on careers has found organizational fluidity.”). 
 33 Id. at 591 (“[T]he employee’s right to obtain and use the knowledge is often 
part of the overall employment package.”). 
 34 Bone, supra note 26, at 244. 
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While trade secret statutes exist at the state rather 
than federal level, nationally promulgated guidelines set out by 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act heavily inform the state-level 
statutes, and substantial convergence has developed around 
UTSA standards.35 The UTSA defines a trade secret as: 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.36 
As the UTSA demonstrates, to be considered a trade 
secret, information must be reasonably protected under the 
circumstances.37 This reasonable efforts provision has itself been 
the subject of substantial debate.38 While scholars and jurists 
continue to debate what constitutes a reasonable effort to protect 
information in a given circumstance, the general consensus is 
that Congress did not intend for the UTSA to require so called 
“super reasonable” measures to establish secrecy.39 A more lenient 
approach to what constitutes reasonable trade secret protections 
is largely justified in economic terms: requiring companies to 
 
 35 Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a 
Digital Environment, 49 IDEA 359, 362 n.5 (2009) (explaining that the UTSA has been 
adopted as the model for state-level trade secret legislation “in 46 states and the 
District of Columbia”). 
 36 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985) (emphasis added); see also 
Graham M. Liccardi, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for 
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155, 
158 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (“There are three essential elements to a state trade 
secret misappropriation claim. First, the information must qualify as a trade secret. 
Second, the plaintiff must have made reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure of its 
trade secret. Third, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acquired the trade 
secret through wrongful means.”). 
 37 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii). 
 38 See, e.g., Jermaine S. Grubbs, Give the Little Guys Equal Opportunity at 
Trade Secret Protection: Why the “Reasonable Efforts” Taken by Small Businesses 
Should be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 421, 425 (2005) 
(arguing that small businesses should have a less stringent burden for making out 
“reasonable efforts”). 
 39 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV 
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (“If trade secrets are protected only if 
their owners take extravagant, productivity-impairing measures to maintain their 
secrecy, the incentive to invest resources in discovering more efficient methods of 
production will be reduced, and with it the amount of invention.”). 
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overinvest in securing trade secrets, such as creating 
sophisticated data protection systems, would stifle innovation.40 
While Herculean efforts to protect data are not required, 
it is well-established that requiring some degree of protection 
furthers valuable policy goals.41 Suppose plaintiff employer 
sues defendant employee for misappropriating company trade 
secrets. Requiring reasonably protective efforts under trade 
secret law provides direct evidence of the defendant employee’s 
wrongdoing, and further suggests that the information was in 
fact valuable to the employer.42 From an evidentiary perspective, 
having protective measures in place helps to shed light on 
situations where a defendant employee has wrongfully 
misappropriated information.43 Put simply, when information is 
not reasonably protected, it is harder for a fact finder to 
determine whether an individual acted wrongfully in 
misappropriating that information. Conversely, when data is 
reasonably protected, it is easier to infer that the 
misappropriation was wrongful.44 In terms of its utility as a proxy 
for the value of misappropriated information, protective measures 
serve as a signal to the fact finder the information is considered 
valuable by its owner and is therefore worthy of judicial 
protection.45 As Judge Posner explains, enforcing trade secret law 
without requiring such reasonably protective efforts would create 
a meaningless distinction between unprotected information and 
the public domain, wherein “the plaintiff . . . would enjoy a 
windfall if permitted to recover damages merely because the 
defendant took the secret from him, rather than from the public 
domain as it could have done with impunity.”46 Beyond these 
more theoretical justifications, requiring plaintiffs to reasonably 
protect their information serves the very practical goal of 
“prevent[ing] misappropriation from occurring altogether.”47 
Trade secret misappropriation in the employment context 
is an undoubtedly serious economic issue for employers,48 and 
has only become more widespread by the ease with which 
 
 40 See Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363 (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 355, 369 (2003)). 
 41 See Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363. 
 42 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 925 F.2d at 178. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 179. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363. 
 48 See Liccardi, supra note 36 (“In September of 2003, Former FBI Director 
Robert Mueller stated that U.S. businesses are losing more than $200 billion dollars 
annually from theft of intellectual property.”). 
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computing technology allows for the transfer of data.49 The 
findings of a 2009 study by the Ponemon Institute, a privacy 
think tank, highlight the extent to which employees are 
misappropriating company data when they leave a job.50 
According to the study, which surveyed 945 adults who had 
changed jobs in some way over the past year, 59% had stolen 
some sort of company data before leaving their job, ranging from 
email lists and non-financial business information to employee 
records and financial information.51 Survey respondents cited 
several reasons for the high levels of data theft, including the 
increasing mobility of employees, feelings of entitlement to the 
information, and the desire to leverage the information in a new 
job.52 Nearly 80% of those surveyed freely admitted that they 
knew they were not allowed to take the information.53 
Despite the widespread misappropriation of company 
data by departing employees, companies seem to be doing 
surprisingly little to address this problem.54 For example, only 
15% of companies surveyed made a practice of conducting 
electronic assessments of documents and files taken by 
employees upon termination, and of companies that did conduct 
such assessments, the majority were either superficial or 
incomplete.55 Further, 24% of departing employees reported that 
their access to company data systems continued after 
termination, and in over 30% of cases, terminated employees 
retained access to company data systems for over a week after 
being terminated.56 While many employers attempt to prohibit 
data theft by including relevant language in employment and 
non-disclosure agreements, simple steps such as ensuring that 
computer access is revoked upon termination, and taking stock 
of laptops and mobile devices issued to employees remain 
 
 49 See Brian Krebs, Data Theft Common by Departing Employees, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 26, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-02-26/news/36791861_1_data-theft-
employer-job. 
 50 PONEMON INST. LLC, DATA LOSS RISKS DURING DOWNSIZING: AS EMPLOYEES 
EXIT, SO DOES CORPORATE DATA 2 (2009), available at http://media.techtarget.com/
Syndication/NATIONALS/Data_Loss_Risks_During_Downsizing_Feb_23_2009.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 4, 10. Respondents to the study who took data before leaving their 
jobs reported the most common ways to take digital files were “downloading 
information onto a CD or DVD[,] . . . on to a USB memory stick[, or] . . . sending 
documents as attachments to a personal email account.” Id. 
 53 Id. at 2. 
 54 See id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 4. 
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underutilized.57 In an increasingly digital and virtual workplace, 
technological advances “present new reasons—and new ways—to 
implement” data protection.58 For example, employers can now 
utilize sophisticated and increasingly inexpensive options such as 
data and email encryption, multi-level passwords, and even the 
ability to remotely wipe sensitive data from company-issued 
laptops and mobile devices.59 While many such measures have gone 
overlooked,60 employers have relied increasingly on the protections 
afforded by the CFAA in protecting their trade secrets. 
II. EMERGENCE OF THE CFAA IN THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTEXT 
When Congress enacted the Counterfeit Access Device 
and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,61 the act was 
relatively narrow in scope, providing criminal penalties for the 
unauthorized use of a computer for just three reasons: 
to obtain classified United States defense or foreign relations 
information with the intent . . . to harm the United States, to obtain 
information contained in a financial record of a financial 
institution[, and] to use, modify, destroy, or disclose information in, 
or prevent authorized use of, a computer operated for or on behalf of 
the United States.62 
Just two years after the CFAA’s passage, the Justice 
Department, frustrated with having to address emergent 
computer crime under outdated mail and wire fraud provisions of 
the criminal code, urged Congress to broaden coverage under the 
CFAA.63 Congress responded in turn by “expand[ing] the scope of 
the Act to encompass additional significant types of computer 
crime.”64 Over the years, the statute “has been amended 
 
 57 Effective Practices: What Technology Issues Should an Employer Consider 
When Terminating an Employee?, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (July 13, 2012), 
http://www.shrm.org/TemplatesTools/hrqa/Pages/TechnologyConsiderationRelatedtoE
mployeeTermination.aspx [hereinafter Effective Practices]. 
 58 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 364. 
 59 Id. at 361. 
 60 Effective Practices, supra note 57. 
 61 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
 62 Griffith, supra note 9, at 460. 
 63 Pamela Taylor, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 207 (2012); see 
also Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 n.6 (E.D. Tex. 1999). 
 64 Griffith, supra note 9, at 474. 
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eight . . . times,”65 with the most substantial amendments 
enacted in 1994 and 1996. 
In 1994, as part of the Violent Crime Control and 
Prevention Act of 1994, Congress added a private cause of 
action to the statute, allowing anyone harmed by a CFAA 
violation to seek compensatory and injunctive relief.66 For such 
a major amendment to the CFAA, there is no clear record of the 
congressional intent behind the decision to establish a private 
cause of action.67 While the precise legislative intent may not be 
readily apparent, Professor Galbraith notes that “[t]he sponsors 
of the amendment made clear . . . that they certainly and 
expressly did not want to open the floodgates to frivolous 
litigation.”68 An onslaught of private litigation was not a real 
concern at the time because when the private cause of action 
was added, the CFAA only applied to “federal interest 
computers,” which were defined as those computers “operated 
by the government or a financial institution.”69 
Galbraith points out that this dynamic changed 
drastically in 1996, when the statute was amended to increase 
the number of computers covered under the CFAA.70 
Specifically, the 1996 amendment replaced the term “federal 
interest computer” with the term “protected computer,” and 
proceeded to define a protected computer as any computer 
previously covered under the act, as well as any computer “used 
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication.”71 This amendment “effectively extended the 
statute’s reach to include any computer connected to the 
 
 65 Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 414. 
 66 Section 1030(g) provides in part that “[a]ny person who suffers damage or 
loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the 
violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). 
 67 See Brenton, supra note 18, at 453. Because the amendment was passed as 
part of the Violent Crime Control and Prevention Act of 1994, which consisted of over 
300 pages of legislation, the legislative history has been called challenging to review. 
Id. While the Senate Report mentions that a civil remedy will deter crime by providing 
aggrieved individuals with a means to obtain relief, “the language in the remainder of 
the report pointing to malicious computer hacking as the motivating force behind the 
statute further argues against a broad scope for the legislation.” Id. 
 68 Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 
63 MD. L. REV. 320, 329 (2004) (quotation omitted). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 330. 
 71 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)2(B). This definition was later expanded to include 
computers used outside of the United States that impacted interstate commerce. See 
United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (D. Conn. 2001). 
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Internet.”72 While the bill’s sponsors made clear that the 
amendment was designed to increase the protection of private 
information stored on both government and civilian computer 
networks, the legislative history seems to indicate that the 
expansion was narrowly directed at protecting industries that 
were beginning to rely on computers as a central part of their 
technical infrastructure.73 In any case, it is apparent that the 
sponsors did not foresee the sweeping reach that the 
amendment would ultimately create.74 
While Congress took numerous steps to broaden the 
CFAA’s scope, the statute’s pleading standard remained relatively 
unchanged.75 The result was a statute that, perhaps 
inadvertently, covered a wide range of activities, many of which 
could hardly be classified as hacking.76 In one provision commonly 
invoked in private causes of actions, the CFAA imposes liability 
on an individual who “intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
obtains . . . information from any protected computer.”77 Another 
provision establishes liability when an individual “knowingly and 
with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such 
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value 
[over] . . . $5,000 in any 1-year period.”78 A third provision covers 
 
 72 Galbraith, supra note 68, at 330. The legislative history of the 1996 
amendment seems to suggest that the amendment’s framers underestimated the pervasive 
rise of personal computing that would come to define the amendment’s scope. S. REP. No. 
104-357, at 7 (1996) (“[I]ncreasingly computer systems provide the vital backbone to 
many other industries, such as transportation, power supply systems, and 
telecommunications.”). 
 73 See S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7 (1996). 
 74 Galbraith, supra note 68, at 331 (“Noticeably absent from the legislative 
history . . . is any suggestion that Congress intended to widen dramatically the protection 
of the CFAA to include all information and all computer systems on the Internet, such as 
non-copyrightable data contained on publicly accessible websites.”). 
 75 In fact, all eight amendments to the CFAA since 1986 have only served to 
expand the act “by adding substantive offenses, lowering levels of scienter, or 
increasing penalties.” Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 415. Further, because the 
amendments have continued to expand coverage under the CFAA, some courts have 
elected to interpret ambiguity in the statute in favor of an expansive reading. See, e.g., 
United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 76 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1261, 1263 (11th Cir. 
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (U.S. 2011) (Social Security Administration 
employee charged under the CFAA for using his SSA computer access to obtain 
information related to women he was romantically interested in). 
 77 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)2(C) (2012). See Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 416 n.60 
(quotation omitted). 
 78 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)4. 
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individuals who intentionally cause damage to a protected 
computer by “transmission of a program [or] code.”79 
After establishing one of these substantive offenses, the 
CFAA allows a private party to obtain compensatory and 
injunctive relief after showing the existence of one of five factors, 
including “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year 
period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value.”80 Courts have read 
“loss” here as encompassing both “(1) the loss in value of trade 
secrets . . . and confidential information that was not previously 
known to the public, and (2) the loss of competitive advantage.”81 
As a result of the CFAA’s expanded scope and 
straightforward pleading requirements, the “floodgates to frivolous 
litigation”82 feared by the sponsors of the 1994 amendment were 
inevitably burst open. In fact, “[s]ince 2002, complaints alleging a 
cause of action under the CFAA have increased nearly 600[ ]  
percent.”83 A far cry from the “bright, intellectually curious, and 
rebellious youth”84 described by Congressman Hughes in 1986, 
many defendants in recent CFAA litigation know little more 
about computers than how to send an email, operate a USB 
flash drive, or set up a Myspace profile.85 
While trade secret statutes have existed for years at the 
state level,86 the expanded CFAA arguably created a second 
basis for liability for trade secret misappropriation claims so 
long as a computer was involved.87 Where such claims would 
 
 79 Id. § 1030(a)5(A); see Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 
419 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 80 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). “Any person who suffers damage or loss by 
reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to 
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief. A civil action 
for a violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors 
set forth in §§ (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of § (c)(4)(A)(i).” Id. § 1030(g) (footnote omitted). 
 81 See e.g. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Command Transp., LLC, No. 05 
Civ. 3401, 2005 WL 3077998, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2005). 
 82 Galbraith, supra note 68, at 329 (quotation omitted). 
 83 Sebastian E. Kaplan, The Rise of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Case, 
FENWICK & WEST LLP 1 (2012), http://www.fenwick.com/fenwickdocuments/2012-03-
20_rise_computer_fraud_abuse_case.pdf. 
 84 132 CONG. REC. 7816 (1986) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes). 
 85 See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(complaint based on emailing documents from a work account to a personal email 
address, as well as accessing a website using a username and password furnished by 
the employer); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (criminal 
prosecution based on setting up a fake Myspace profile in violation of the website’s 
terms of service); SKF USA, Inc. v. Bjerkness, 636 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(complaint based on data saved to USB thumb drives); Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. 
v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2000) 
(complaint based on emailing documents from work email to defendant employer). 
 86 Bone, supra note 26, at 247. 
 87 Brenton, supra note 18, at 430. 
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otherwise be raised at the state level, likely under a UTSA-
inspired statute, the CFAA offers employers a number of 
benefits over the state-level trade secret statutes. 
First, the CFAA offers substantially simpler pleading 
requirements compared to equivalent state-level trade secret 
law.88 While trade secret law focuses on whether the material 
taken rises to the level of a trade secret and whether the 
plaintiff took reasonable efforts in protecting the information,89 
the CFAA “puts no qualification on the nature or character of 
the information taken—it focuses squarely and solely on the 
actions of the defendant in obtaining it.”90 In other words, 
where trade secret law requires a plaintiff to establish (1) the 
existence of a trade secret, (2) reasonable protective efforts, and 
(3) wrongful misappropriation, the CFAA focuses only on the 
third element, whether the misappropriation was wrongful.91 
In addition to its simpler pleading requirements, the 
CFAA “provides [plaintiffs with] a basis for federal jurisdiction.”92 
By bringing a CFAA claim, employers may bring suit against the 
defendant’s new employer as well as the individual, and also seek 
injunctive relief, elements not widely available under the UTSA-
influenced state laws.93 Further, the CFAA allows employers to 
effectively enforce non-compete agreements that would be 
otherwise unenforceable under state law in cases where former 
employees use misappropriated information to compete in a 
new position.94 And because of supplemental jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), bringing a CFAA claim in federal court 
does not preclude employer plaintiffs from raising state trade 
secret claims.95 In some cases, employers have recovered 
 
 88 For example, a typical state claim for trade secret misappropriation under the 
UTSA requires the plaintiff to show that the misappropriated information was secret, that the 
plaintiff derived economic value from its secrecy, and that reasonable efforts were made to 
maintain the information’s secrecy. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985). Under 
the CFAA, a plaintiff is not required to establish any of these elements. 
 89 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985). 
 90 Brenton, supra note 18, at 434. 
 91 Liccardi, supra note 36, at 158. 
 92 Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 418. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Peter J. Pizzi, Disloyal Employees: Computer Abuse Law Turns on Meaning 
of “Without Authorization,” N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 2006, at 5, available at 
http://www.connellfoley.com/sites/default/files/pjp_nylj_disloyal_employees_0.pdf. 
 95 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2011) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts 
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over 
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original 
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 
United States Constitution.”). In fact, courts may continue to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over pendent state claims after dismissing the underlying federal claim. 
See, e.g., Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 450, 2013 WL 
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damages under both state-level trade secret and CFAA 
provisions in the same action.96 
While the expanding amendments to the CFAA opened 
the doors to private litigation in 1996, it was not until 2000 
that employers began to realize the CFAA’s utility in the trade 
secret context.97 That year, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington held in Shurgard Storage 
Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. that the revamped 
CFAA could apply to a “rogue employee.”98 
In Shurgard, the plaintiff, Shurgard Storage Centers, 
Inc., had been an “industry leader” in the development and 
maintenance of self-storage facilities in the United States and 
abroad for over 25 years.99 In a market with a high barrier to 
entry, Shurgard created “a sophisticated system” to determine 
potential storage facility sites, markets, and strategies.100 The 
defendant, Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., was a direct competitor of 
Shurgard, and relatively new to the industry, having entered the 
market just three years before the suit.101 Shurgard alleged in its 
complaint that Safeguard had offered a job to Eric Leland, a 
regional development manager with Shurgard, who was 
entrusted with access to a wide array of Shurgard’s business 
and marketing information.102 The complaint alleged that 
before leaving Shurgard to work for Safeguard, Leland “sent e-
mails to the defendant containing various trade secrets and 
proprietary information belonging to the plaintiff.”103 The 
complaint further alleged that Leland continued to share 
propriety information with Safeguard after leaving Shurgard, 
and that Safeguard continued to target other Shurgard 
employees based on their intimate knowledge of Shurgard’s 
business and marketing plans.104 
In denying Safeguard’s motion to dismiss, the District 
Court upheld the plaintiff ’ s CFAA claim by finding that 
                                                                                                                       
4498993, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) (issuing an opinion on purely state claims 
after dismissing the underlying CFAA claim last year). 
 96 See e.g. Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 
2004) (plaintiff “awarded $150,000 on each of three” violations under the CFAA and an 
additional $60,000 for violations of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act). 
 97 Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 418. 
 98 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. 
Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 99 Id. at 1122. 
 100 Id. at 1123. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
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Leland’s emails to defendant Safeguard were sent “without 
authorization,” despite the fact that Leland had been employed 
by Shurgard and had full access to the information in question 
at the time of the transfer.105 To reach that conclusion, the 
court applied concepts of general agency law to the employee’s 
computer usage.106 Specifically, the court relied on § 112 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, which states that “the 
authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the 
principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise 
guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”107 
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the court found that 
the employee’s authorization terminated the moment the 
employee “obtained and sent the proprietary information to the 
defendant via e-mail.”108 The court went on to uphold the other 
two claims asserted under the CFAA,109 but it was this broad, 
agency-based interpretation of authorization that seemed to open 
the door to future claims by employers under the CFAA.110 
Following the court’s decision in Shurgard, employers quickly 
realized that the CFAA provided a favorable alternative to state-
level trade secret claims, and private actions alleging claims 
under the CFAA began to increase sharply.111 
A. The Debate over Authorization in the CFAA 
As private CFAA complaints increase in the 
employment and trade secret contexts, courts continue to 
struggle with the concept of authorization, which appears to be 
 
 105 Id. at 1124, 1129. 
 106 Id. at 1125. 
 107 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)). 
 108 Id. In so doing, the court relied on a formulation of authorization that far 
pre-dated the invention of the computer. The opinion makes no attempt to show that 
the CFAA’s drafters intended authorization to be defined in terms of agency law rather 
than in a technological sense. Id. 
 109 Id. at 1126-27. The court held that Safeguard had established a claim 
under § 1030(a)(4), which covers an individual who “‘knowingly and with intent to 
defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized 
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything 
of value [over $5,000].’” Id. at 1125 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012)). The court 
also found that Safeguard had established a claim under § 1030(a)(5)(C), which creates 
liability for any individual who “‘intentionally accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage.’” Id. at 1126 (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C)). 
 110 Kapitanyan, supra note 15, at 423 (“Although Shurgard was the first case 
of its kind, it certainly has not been the only attempt to offer a viable interpretation of 
the elusive concept.”). 
 111 Kaplan, supra note 83, at 1 (“Since 2002, complaints alleging a cause of 
action under the CFAA have increased nearly 600%[.]”). 
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the only provision potentially limiting the CFAA’s broad scope. 
The authorization requirement found in many of the CFAA’s 
substantive sections provides that someone is only liable under 
the CFAA if he or she “ . . . accessed a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access.”112 Thus, whether an 
employee is authorized, or whether an employee has exceeded 
his or her authorized access has in many cases determined the 
success or failure of a CFAA claim.113 To complicate the issue, 
the CFAA fails to provide a definition of the term 
“authorization” as it relates to the statute,114 and it only 
provides a definition for the term “exceeds authorized access,” 
leaving courts to interpret the phrase “without authorization.”115 
The CFAA defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a 
computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or 
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not 
entitled so to obtain or alter.”116 
While a plain reading suggests that “exceeds authorized 
access” was intended to cover employees who misappropriate 
information from their current job, a number of courts have 
instead applied the term “without authorization” to current 
employees by adopting an agency-based approach to 
authorization.117 To reach this conclusion, some courts have 
argued that under principles of agency law, authorization to 
access a computer terminates at the moment an employee 
breaches a duty of loyalty to his or her employer.118 
Other courts have rejected this broad agency 
interpretation.119 These courts have held that because the CFAA 
is primarily a criminal statute, ambiguous terms should be 
decided in favor of lenity.120 Under this approach, if a term is 
unclear, it should be interpreted in favor of the defendant and 
against the government.121 Thus, the argument runs, it is 
improper to hold that someone who has been granted permission 
to access to a computer system can access the computer without 
authorization, because authorization begins and ends with the 
 
 112 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4), & (5)(B)–(C) all contain similar 
language related to authorization. 
 113 Compare Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 
2006), with LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 114 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1132. 
 115 18 U.S.C § 1030(e)(6). 
 116 Id. (quotations omitted). 
 117 See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420; Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
 118 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21. 
 119 See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133. 
 120 Id. at 1134 (citing United States v. Carr, 513 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 121 Id. 
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employer’s granting and rescinding access.122 As private litigants 
continue to test the outward boundaries of the CFAA’s 
applicability in the employment context, these contrasting 
interpretations have resulted in a sizable and developing 
circuit split that has garnered much attention.123 
While first articulated in Shurgard,124 the agency-based 
approach to authorization under the CFAA gained prominence 
in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin,125 which was 
at the time considered “the primary appellate interpretation of 
the authorization language in the CFAA.”126 Jacob Citrin was 
an employee of International Airport Centers (IAC), tasked 
with investigating real estate properties that IAC was 
interested in buying.127 After working at IAC for eight years, 
Citrin decided to quit his job and compete directly with his former 
employer.128 According to the facts alleged by IAC, Citrin 
“fraudulently misappropriated” a host of IAC information 
including confidential information and work product,129 before 
deleting all of the files on his laptop using a “secure-erasure 
program” to prevent any recovery of the deleted files.130 IAC sued 
Citrin under a number of CFAA provisions, including 
§ 1030(a)(5)(B), which establishes liability against any 
individual who “intentionally accesses a protected computer 
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, 
recklessly causes damage.”131 
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of IAC’s suit, 
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
determined that despite the fact that Citrin was employed by 
IAC at the time he accessed the computer, his access was 
nonetheless “without authorization.”132 To reach this conclusion, 
 
 122 Id. at 1135. 
 123 See, e.g., Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, Fourth Circuit Widens Split Over 
CFAA and Employees Violating Computer Use Restrictions, KILPATRICK TOWNSEND (Sept. 
10, 2012), http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment.aspx?od=305497&id= 
1585568&filename=asr-1585570.CFAA.pdf. 
 124 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. 
Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 125 Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 126 Amber L. Leaders, Gimme A Brekka!: Deciphering “Authorization” Under 
the CFAA and How Employers Can Protect Their Data, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 285, 
289 (2011). 
 127 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. 
 128 Id; see also Brief for Respondent, Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (No. 06-2073), 2006 
WL 1354181, at *2.  
 129 Int’l Airport Centers LLC v. Citrin, 2005 WL 241463, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
31, 2005). 
 130 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. 
 131 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(5)(B) (2012). 
 132 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420. 
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Judge Posner employed the agency approach introduced in 
Shurgard133 and determined that Citrin’s authorization had 
ended the very moment he decided he would delete the 
incriminating files from his work computer.134 Posner reasoned 
that Citrin’s “authorization to access the laptop terminated 
when, having already engaged in misconduct and decided to 
quit IAC in violation of his employment contract, he resolved to 
destroy files . . . in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency 
law imposes on an employee.”135 
While Citrin is one of the most notable examples of the 
agency-based approach to authorization under the CFAA,136 a 
number of courts have followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead and 
adopted a broad reading of authorization. In United States v. John, 
the Fifth Circuit found that even where an employee has full access 
to a computer system, he or she can still act without authorization 
because authorization under the CFAA encompasses “the use of 
information obtained by permitted access to a computer system 
and data available on that system.”137 In United States v. 
Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee of the Social 
Security Administration with full permission to view sensitive 
personal information on SSA computers, but who accessed that 
information in romantic pursuit of a number of women in his 
church study group, likewise violated the CFAA because his 
computer use violated a written SSA policy.138 
Some commentators have leveled a number of similar 
but distinct criticisms at the broad, agency-based approach to 
authorization under the CFAA. Perhaps the most common 
criticism of the agency approach is that such an interpretation 
almost certainly reaches more employee conduct than 
legislatively intended.139 For example, under the agency approach, 
one could argue that “[a]n employee who checks their personal 
email at work, in violation of company policy, would be a 
criminal.”140 Finding no clear support in the legislative record, this 
 
 133 See supra Part II, explaining the Shurgard court’s reliance on the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency to interpret the phrase “without authorization.” 
 134 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Leaders, supra note 126, at 289. 
 137 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 138 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011). 
 139 Kaplan, supra note 83, at 1. 
 140 David J. Rosen, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A Code-
Based Approach to “Exceeds Authorized Access”, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 737, 750 (2012) 
(quoting Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1586-86 (2010)). 
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broad scope is only compounded by the probability that the vast 
majority of employees remain unaware that such a wide range of 
their workplace conduct could lead to civil and even criminal 
liability. The “agency approach ‘gives employees insufficient 
notice of what line distinguishes computer use that is allowed 
from computer use that is prohibited.’”141 This lack of clarity is 
particularly troubling in an increasingly fluid workplace, where 
employees switch jobs with greater frequency, and seek to 
bring their skills and experience with them.142 Further, the line 
between personal and work-based computing is constantly 
blurring, which can lead employees to take unlawful action 
that they do not have any reason to believe is unlawful.143 
Another common argument leveled against the agency 
approach is one of statutory construction: 
[T]he agency approach, if applied to the text of §§ 1030(a)(2) and (a)(4), 
would collapse the distinction between “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorized access.” If an employee’s authorization to access a 
computer ceases as soon as she does something that is not in her 
employer’s interests, then “exceeds authorized access” likely becomes 
textually superfluous and meaningless.144 
Put differently, arguing that an employee acts “without 
authorization” as soon as the employee acts contrary to his or her 
employer’s interests would render the “exceeds authorized access” 
provision absurd. Under this reading an employee could only 
“exceed[ ]  authorized access” by wrongfully misappropriating data 
while continuing to maintain an appropriate agent-principal 
relationship. Because such misappropriation would have to be 
aligned with the employer’s interests, it seems impossible for an 
employer to successfully claim injury under this provision.145 
 
 141 Id. (quoting Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1586 (2010)). 
 142 See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: 
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 74-83 (2004); see also 
Krebs, supra note 49. 
 143 “[M]ore employees are storing their business and customer contacts online 
at services like LinkedIn.com, some employees may not believe they are doing anything 
wrong when they take customer lists and other internal company data when they move 
on to a new job.” Krebs, supra note 49. 
 144 Rosen, supra note 140, at 751 (footnotes omitted). 
 145 An online commenter attempts to provide a hypothetical fulfilling such a 
definition of “exceeds authorized access”: 
Scenario: Boss asks employee to print out his schedule for the coming week. 
Employee, without asking Boss, uses Boss’ CPU to print it from the cloud. In 
the process of printing it out, Employee also sends the pre-meeting notes 
from the same file to the printer in her office. Employee then faxes the pre-
meeting notes to a competitor who sends her $6k. 
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While this broad view of authorization still has firm support in 
some circuits, “[a] growing number of cases are adopting the 
narrow view.”146 
On the other side of the circuit split is a narrower 
interpretation of authorization, “holding that the CFAA prohibits 
improper ‘access’ of computer information, rather than misuse or 
misappropriation of such information.”147 Under this narrow view, 
also called the “[p]lain [l]anguage [i]nterpretation,”148 
“[a]uthorization begins and ends with the employer, not the 
employee . . . . An employee acts without authorization only if the 
employer never gives permission or affirmatively rescinds 
permission.”149 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in LVRC Holdings, 
LLC v. Brekka is considered the leading view on the narrow 
interpretation of CFAA authorization.150 
Joseph Brekka was hired by LVRC, a residential 
addiction treatment center, to oversee various operations within 
the facility, including marketing programs.151 “At the time [he] 
was hired [by LVRC], Brekka owned and operated” two 
consulting businesses that used internet marketing to connect 
patients with addiction care facilities.152 While working for 
LVRC and continuing to run his own businesses, Brekka 
emailed a number of documents related to his work for LVRC to 
his personal email account.153 In addition, after resigning from 
LVRC, Brekka continued to use login credentials issued to him 
by LVRC to access a system which provided internet traffic 
statistics relating to LVRC’s website.154 Upon learning of the 
emails Brekka sent to his personal account and the continued 
access to the internet traffic site, LVRC brought a federal 
action under the CFAA. LVRC alleged that Brekka’s conduct 
violated two provisions of the CFAA,155 both of which require 
                                                                                                                       
Not legal advice. Don’t rely., Comment to Recent Developments—Both in the Courts and 
in Congress—on the Scope of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(July 30, 2012, 11:35 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/30/recent-developments-
both-in-the-courts-and-in-congress-on-the-scope-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/. 
 146 Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 450, 2012 WL 
2524008, at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012). 
 147 Id. at *3. 
 148 Leaders, supra note 126, at 290. 
 149 Id. at 291. 
 150 Id. 
 151 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 1129-30. 
 154 Id. at 1130. 
 155 Section 1030(a)(2) provides for relief against any individual who 
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, 
and thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.” 18 U.S.C. 
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that the individual either acted “without authorization,” or 
“exceed[ed] authorized access.”156 In upholding the district court’s 
motion to dismiss the claim, the Ninth Circuit rejected the agency 
reading of authorization, noting that “[n]o language in the CFAA 
supports [the] argument that authorization to use a computer 
ceases when an employee resolves to use the computer contrary to 
the employer’s interest.”157 Instead the court defined authorization 
“as taking [its] ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”158 
Under this interpretation, the fact that LVRC had given 
permission to use the computer meant that Brekka had 
authorization at the time of access, and thus there was no 
cause of action under the CFAA.159 
A number of courts have agreed with the reasoning set 
forth in Brekka, adopting a narrow, “plain language” 
interpretation of authorization under the CFAA.160 Most 
recently, the Fourth Circuit, in WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions, LLC v. Miller, joined the Ninth Circuit’s narrow 
interpretation.161 In WEC, the plaintiff alleged that Mike 
Miller, a former WEC employee who began working for a direct 
competitor, had emailed a number of proprietary WEC documents 
to himself before quitting, and had subsequently used those 
documents in a presentation given to a potential client on behalf 
of his new employer.162 The court held that WEC’s policy 
prohibiting employees from downloading proprietary information 
to personal computers did not constitute a revocation of 
authorization, and while the information may have been 
misappropriated, it did not occur via unauthorized access.163 
While support is not as clear at the circuit level, a number of 
district courts have signaled their support for a narrow reading.164 
                                                                                                                       
§ 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). Section 1030(a)(4) provides for relief against any individual who 
“knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the 
intended fraud and obtains anything of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 156 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (4); Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1131. 
 157 Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133. 
 158 Id. at 1132 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
 159 Id. at 1137. 
 160 See Dana Ltd. v. Am. Axle & Mfg. Holdings, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 450, 2012 WL 
2524008, at *3-4 (W.D. Mich. June 29, 2012); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex 
Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 161 WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2012); 
see also Nicholas J. Wagoner, 4th Circuit Deepens Division Over Scope of Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, CIRCUIT SPLITS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/08/4th-circuit-
deepens-division-over-scope-of-computer-fraud-abuse-act.html. 
 162 Miller, 687 F.3d at 201-02. 
 163 Id. at 207. 
 164 See Dana Ltd., 2012 WL 2524008, at *5; Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F. 
Supp. 2d at 386. 
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For example, the court in Dana Limited v. American Axle and 
Manufacturing Holdings, Inc. in Michigan’s Western District, 
indicated that the Sixth Circuit is likely to rely on the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning and adopt the narrow interpretation of 
authorization.165 In Orbit One Communications, Inc. v. 
Numerex Corp., the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York indicated that the Second Circuit is likely to join in 
adopting a narrow interpretation.166 In addition to support from 
the district courts, the Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its 
prior rule in United States v. Nosal, in which a former 
employee of an executive search firm convinced a number of 
former colleagues to help him start a competing firm by 
“us[ing] their log-in credentials to download source lists, names 
and contact information from a confidential database on the 
company’s computer.”167 
B. Legislative Proposals to Amend the CFAA 
In addition to increasing jurisprudential support, it seems 
that a narrow interpretation of authorization may be gaining favor 
with legislators, albeit slowly.168 Senator Patrick Leahy proposed 
an amendment to the CFAA as part of the Cybersecurity Act of 
2012 that would enhance the CFAA’s penalties, while officially 
adopting a narrow view of authorization.169 Specifically, the 
amendment would alter § 1030(e)6, to provide that ‘without 
authorization’ 
does not include access in violation of a contractual obligation or 
agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service 
agreement, with an Internet service provider, Internet website, or 
non-government employer, if such violation constitutes the sole basis 
 
 165 Dana Ltd., 2012 WL 2524008, at *4-5. 
 166 Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d at 386. 
 167 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 168 See Orin Kerr, Recent Developments—Both in the Courts and in Congress—
on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 30, 2012, 11:35 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/30/recent-developments-both-in-the-courts-and-in-
congress-on-the-scope-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/; see also Tony Romm, After 
Activist Aaron Swartz’s Death, a Tough Slog for Aaron’s Law, POLITICO (Feb. 8, 2013, 
4:48 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/activist-aaron-swartz-death-aarons-
law-87332.html (explaining that legislative efforts to narrow the CFAA are at “the 
beginning of a new and lengthy political journey.”). 
 169 Cyber Crime Protection Security Act, S.3414, 112th Cong. § 8 (proposed 
amendment, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
07/Leahy-Cybercrime-Amendment-to-S3414JEN12557.pdf. 
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for determining that access to a protected computer is 
unauthorized.170 
Essentially, the amendment would preclude the agency 
interpretation by providing that a breach of an agreement such 
as a computer use policy cannot, by itself, establish liability 
under the CFAA. Not surprisingly, the Department of Justice 
voiced support for the stricter penalties proposed by the 
amendment, while opposing the narrowed scope.171 
While the Senate voted down the Cybersecurity Act, 
Leahy’s amendment was revived in early 2013, following the 
suicide of Aaron Swartz, a computer programmer and internet 
activist who had been indicted two years earlier under the 
CFAA for attempting to download and distribute a vast portion 
of JSTOR’s academic research database.172 Following Swartz’s 
death, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren introduced a legislative 
amendment to the CFAA dubbed “Aaron’s Law,” that essentially 
mirrored the Leahy amendment.173 It would amend the CFAA to 
establish that “unauthorized access does not include access in 
violation of an agreement or contractual obligation, such as an 
acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an 
Internet service provider, Internet website, or employer.”174 
Despite apparent widespread public support for the narrowing 
language included in Aaron’s Law, the language was notably 
absent from draft changes to the CFAA distributed to the House 
Judiciary Committee in 2013.175 In fact, the amended language 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 Greg Nojeim & Jake Laperruque, Why Fibbing About Your Age is Relevant 
to the Cybersecurity Bill, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 30, 2012), 
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/greg-nojeim/3007why-fibbing-about-your-age-relevant-
cybersecurity-bill; see also Kerr, supra note 168. 
 172 Timothy B. Lee, “Aaron’s Law, Congressional investigation in wake of Swartz 
suicide, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/aarons-
law-congressional-investigation-in-wake-of-swartz-suicide/. 
 173 In fact, the language of the two amendments are almost completely 
identical, save for a few stylistic changes. See Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 
113th Cong. (introduced by R. Zoe Lofgren), available at http://www.lofgren.house.gov/ 
images/user_images/gt/stories/pdf/aarons%20law%20-%20lofgren%20-%20061913.pdf.  
 174 Lee, supra note 172 (internal quotation omitted). Perhaps reflecting the 
lack of legislative understanding of the CFAA, “Aaron’s Law” would not have had any 
impact on Swartz’s conviction under the CFAA, as Swartz would have been equally 
liable under the narrow view of authorization which the amendment would have 
established. Andy Greenberg, “Aaron’s Law” Suggests Reforms to Computer Fraud Act 
(But Not Enough to Have Protected Aaron Swartz), FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013, 8:58 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/01/16/aarons-law-suggests-reforms-to-
hacking-acts-but-not-enough-to-have-protected-aaron-swartz/.  
 175 See H.R., 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
132249133/House-Judiciary-Committee-discussion-draft (a discussion draft concerning 
changes distributed to House Judiciary Committee). 
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before the House Judiciary Committee would actually expand the 
CFAA’s scope by increasing maximum penalties and punishing 
attempted CFAA violations as seriously as actual offenses.176 
Thus, while narrowing the CFAA’s authorization language may 
be gaining popular support, it seems that legislative action is 
still far off.177 
C. The CFAA’s Impact on Policy Goals of Trade Secret Law 
Considering the rise of the CFAA in the trade secret and 
employment context against the backdrop of substantive trade 
secret legislation, it is apparent that the CFAA undercuts 
several of the goals advanced by trade secret law.178 As 
discussed, trade secret law strikes an important “balance between 
safeguarding business information and guaranteeing employee 
mobility.”179 This balance results from the emphasis that trade 
secret law places on the character of misappropriated data. While 
it is important for companies to protect sufficiently valuable 
information, it is equally important that employees be allowed to 
bring their skills and experiences with them to new jobs.180 
By ignoring the character of the information 
misappropriated, the CFAA disrupts this balance, eroding both 
the evidentiary and value-identifying purposes furthered by the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act requirement of reasonably protective 
measures.181 For the courts, the fact that a defendant has to 
overcome reasonably protective measures to misappropriate a 
trade secret serves a strong evidentiary function, indicating that 
the misappropriation was indeed wrongful.182 Further, the 
protections serve to put both the court, as well as the defendant, 
on notice that the information at issue was valuable to the 
employer and that a judicial remedy is therefore appropriate.183 
In contrast, the CFAA offers no such protection, and does not 
 
 176 See id.; see also Orin Kerr, House Judiciary Committee New Draft Bill on 
Cybersecurity is Mostly DOJ’s Proposed Language from 2011, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Mar. 25, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/03/25/house-judiciary-committee-
new-draft-bill-on-cybersecurity-is-mostly-dojs-proposed-language-from-2011/. 
 177 See Orin Kerr, The Prospects for Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/ 
02/09/the-prospects-for-reform-of-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/. 
 178 See Brenton, supra note 18, at 447. 
 179 Id. at 449. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See supra Part II (discussing the theoretical goals furthered by requiring 
reasonable protective efforts in trade secret law). 
 182 See supra Part II. 
 183 See supra Part II. 
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require anything that would put an employee on notice that 
such information is secretive and worth protecting. It could be 
argued that the CFAA’s authorization provision sufficiently 
puts an employee on notice as to whether information is fair 
game or not. However, this argument fails under the broad 
agency-based definition of authorization under the CFAA 
adopted by some courts, under which an employee’s actions, 
rather than an employer’s restrictions on access determine 
whether the employee acts without authorization.184 
Beyond eroding the theoretical policy considerations of 
trade secret law, the CFAA’s lack of a reasonably protective 
measures requirement may discourage employers from adequately 
investing in data protection, which is economically inefficient.185 In 
the Ponemon Institute’s 2009 study gauging CEO, COO, and CFO 
attitudes toward investment in data protection, executives 
pointed to many benefits of investing in data protection beyond 
reducing the risk of data loss or theft.186 Executives noted that 
investment in such protection also resulted in increased customer 
trust, decreased “customer churn,” reduced risk of penalty under 
e-discovery laws and other regulations, and 
“reduc[ed] . . . operational inefficiencies by creating more efficient 
uses of data.”187 The study further suggested a “very healthy 
[return on investment] for such data protection systems.”188 
In addition to the general success and secondary benefits 
created by effective data protection programs, there remains the 
very practical and obvious consideration that data protection will 
prevent misappropriation in the first place.189 By preventing data 
theft through simple security investments, employers save the 
cost of litigating preventable disputes, and society benefits by 
reducing the load placed on an already overburdened federal 
court system.190 Despite the widespread benefits and availability 
of effective data protection systems, the CFAA in its current form 
includes no requirement that an employer take even marginal 
 
 184 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2166 (2011); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); 
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1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
 185 See PONEMON INST. LLC, supra note 50, at 14. 
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 189 Cundiff, supra note 35, at 363. 
 190 See, e.g., Press Release, Diane Feinstein Senate Office, Senator Feinstein 
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efforts to protect its data in order to make out a claim, allowing 
it to serve as an end run on trade secret law. 
III. POLICY REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING A NARROW 
READING OF AUTHORIZATION 
A formal legislative or judicial adoption of the narrow 
interpretation of authorization, as laid out in Brekka, would 
prevent the CFAA from undercutting trade secret law. By 
requiring that an employee do more than simply violate an 
employer’s acceptable use policy to exceed authorized access, 
proposals such as Leahy’s amendment and “Aaron’s Law” would 
functionally establish a rudimentary reasonable efforts 
requirement in the CFAA.191 By requiring that a defendant have 
breached some form of protection beyond a written computer use 
policy effectively means that to bring a claim under the CFAA, 
employers would have to restrict computer access beyond merely 
instituting a written computer use policy. This requirement 
could serve, at least in part, the evidentiary purpose of 
requiring reasonably protective efforts.192 When an employee 
misappropriates information in violation of only a computer 
use policy, such a violation carries little, if any, evidentiary 
value in demonstrating to the fact finder that the employee’s 
actions were wrongful. 
By requiring the breach of a computer use policy along 
with the breach of some other form of protection, Leahy’s 
proposed amendment would demonstrate to fact finders, at least 
to some degree, that the misappropriation might have been 
wrongful.193 Requiring more than a breach of an employer’s 
computer use policy would also serve to more effectively put 
employees on notice as to when their conduct is wrongful and 
potentially illegal. Conceding that the amendment would be 
helpful in an evidentiary sense, it likewise presents a vagueness 
that could quickly become a source of judicial disagreement: while 
the breach of a computer use policy cannot be the sole basis for 
finding a lack of authorization,194 what protection would be 
sufficient? Limiting physical access to a computer system 
would almost certainly be enough, but courts could also find 
 
 191 See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(ii) (1985). 
 192 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th 
Cir. 1991). 
 193 Cyber Crime Protection Security Act, S. 3414, 112th Cong. § 8 (proposed 
amendment, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
07/Leahy-Cybercrime-Amendment-to-S3414JEN12557.pdf. 
 194 Id. 
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that the breach of a computer use policy, along with the breach 
of some other policy, such as a confidentiality agreement or 
non-compete agreement, is sufficient. This limiting provision 
would be helpful, but could create a new type of confusion in 
computer use jurisprudence. 
IV. A “REASONABLE EFFORTS” AMENDMENT TO THE CFAA 
Establishing a narrow reading of authorization would be 
a step in the right direction, but does not go far enough to 
prevent the CFAA from undermining the policy goals of trade 
secret law. This is primarily because, even under a narrow view 
of authorization, the CFAA is still only concerned with the nature 
of the misappropriation, and fails to consider the character of the 
information misappropriated.195 Where trade secret law 
distinguishes between that information which merits protection 
and that information which does not, the CFAA, under either a 
broad or narrow reading, makes no such distinction.196 But it is 
this very distinction that, in trade secret law, preserves the 
balance between employee mobility on the one hand (by 
declining to protect some information), and encouraging 
innovation on the other (by protecting information that merits 
such protection).197 
Even under a narrow reading of authorization, an 
employer could still bring a CFAA claim over misappropriated 
data regardless of whether that data merited the protection it 
received.198 Further, while narrowing the CFAA’s scope may 
mirror the evidentiary benefits of reasonable effort provisions 
in trade secret law, a narrowed CFAA serves none of the value 
identifying functions performed by reasonable efforts in trade 
secret law.199 By not requiring information to be reasonably 
protected to make out a claim, the CFAA does nothing to signal 
to either courts or employees that a particular file or document 
is so valued by an employer that it merits special protection. By 
focusing only on authorization to access the information in the 
first place, the CFAA establishes one broad level of protection 
 
 195 Brenton, supra note 18, at 434. 
 196 See § 1030(a)(2)(C) (providing liability for anyone who “intentionally 
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
obtains . . . information from any protected computer”). 
 197 See Bone, supra note 26, at 262. 
 198 For example, even under a narrow interpretation, an employee would be 
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 199 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 925 F.2d at 179. 
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for all information contained on a given computer system, 
regardless of whether that information is private or public, 
valuable or worthless.200 Lastly, by failing to consider the 
character of the information misappropriated, a narrowly 
interpreted CFAA perpetuates an inefficient labor market, 
where employees are unsure what information they may take 
with them to new positions, and what information belongs to 
their employer.201 While narrowing the scope of the CFAA by 
legislative amendment is certainly a step in the right direction, 
even a narrowly interpreted CFAA threatens to erode the 
careful policy considerations behind trade secret law. 
Amending the CFAA to include a requirement that 
misappropriated information must have been subject to 
reasonably protective measures would eliminate most, if not 
all, concerns that the CFAA impinges too greatly on trade 
secret law. Specifically, Congress should amend the CFAA’s 
authorization provision such that it applies to anyone who 
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or 
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information 
from any protected computer, provided that such information is 
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”202 
By amending this provision, the CFAA would more 
closely mirror the substantive pleading requirements of trade 
secret law,203 lowering the incentive for employers to favor the 
CFAA over state-level trade secret statutes. Such an amendment 
would uphold the balance established by trade secret law between 
protecting valuable proprietary information, while allowing 
employees to utilize for their own individual benefit information 
that does not warrant protection.204 By requiring employers to show 
that they reasonably protected their information, the CFAA would 
provide valuable evidence to fact finders indicating that a 
defendant was wrongful in misappropriating that information, 
while also signaling to courts and employees that the information 
was important enough to merit such protection.205 
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 201 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: 
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 575, 592 (2007). 
 202 This proposed amendment draws language directly from the Uniform Trade 
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This amendment would also serve to keep the CFAA 
adaptable in a constantly changing technological environment. 
Those securities measures considered reasonable today may be 
wholly unsatisfactory several years from now. As technology 
advances and the cost of sophisticated data protection decreases, 
this fact-sensitive approach would allow courts to hold employers to 
an appropriate and contemporary standard of data protection.206 
Most importantly, amending the CFAA to include a 
reasonable efforts provision would bring the statute more closely 
in line with its original purpose—to provide much needed 
protection at the federal level against the threat of serious 
security breaches executed by sophisticated computer hackers.207 
There is no question that an employer should be adequately 
protected against individuals who wrongfully hack into a 
computer system and steal valuable information. That said, 
there is no reason that employers should be excused from the 
responsibility of protecting their information in a reasonable 
manner, simply because that information is stored on a 
computer. By amending the CFAA to include a reasonable 
efforts provision, Congress will ensure that employers continue 
to enjoy protection against sophisticated data theft, and in 
exchange, need only protect their information in a manner that 
is considered reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy. 
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